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 Majority Identitarian Populism in Britain 
 Gabriella   Lazaridis and  Vasiliki   Tsagkroni 
 Introduction 
 In the 2014 European Parliament elections, Eurosceptic and far-right 
populist parties made an impact: the French Front National (FN) gained 
of 24.85 per cent of the popular vote, the Greek neo-Nazi Golden Dawn 
party 9.4 per cent, the Italian Five-Star Movement (M5S) 21.2 per cent, 
the Sweden Democrats (SD) 9.7  per cent and UKIP 26.6  per cent. 
Europe’s vote pointed to a Eurosceptic surge challenging the already 
established mainstream parties in its member states. 
 Far-right populist parties as we know them today began to emerge 
in the 1980s, while parties that were linked with fascist ideology in the 
past (e.g. MSI 1 in Italy) started to evolve in order to create a more legiti-
mate image and attract the electorate. By adopting a majority identitar-
ian populist rhetoric and emphasising socio-cultural and identity issues, 
1  MSI (Italian Social Movement). 
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these parties have experienced growing success. Th is form of populism 
will be examined in this chapter as part of the rhetoric of the far (radical 
and extreme) right representatives on the British political scene: namely 
UKIP (UK Independence Party), the BNP (British National Party), and 
the EDL (English Defence League). 
 With the Euro-crisis and the pronounced socio-economic issues that 
ensued, far-right populist parties have sought to point out the poten-
tial threats to EU member states’ national identities, based on a rhetoric 
enriched with elements of authoritarianism, populism, ethno- nationalism 
and welfare nationalism that often targets the ‘other’ (immigrants, 
Muslims, homosexuals, the Roma, etc.) as one of the major threats to 
‘the nation and its people’. 
 In the UK, although the far right was not as popular as in other 
European countries (such as the Nordic countries) in the late 1980s, 
a combination of circumstances in the late 2000s brought a change 
to the domestic political scene. Rising rates of immigration (see 
Migration Observatory  2015 ) and general concern about multicul-
turalism (see David Cameron’s criticism on state multiculturalism, 2 
 2011 ), together with increasing Islamophobia and the economic 
crisis, created a fertile ground for the support of far-right populist 
representatives. 
 UKIP, although active since 1993, managed to achieve a strong per-
formance in the 2014 European Parliament elections, becoming the 
strongest party at the time in the UK. 3 With its Eurosceptic discourse, 
xenophobia and strong anti-immigration policies, UKIP managed to 
make a breakthrough on the country’s political scene and increase its 
political infl uence (Ford et al.  2012 ). On the other hand, EDL, a protest 
group formed in 2009, managed to create a sense of cultural alientation 
2  David Cameron told the 47th Munich Security Conference in 2011, attended by world leaders, 
that state multiculturalism had failed in the UK, echoing a similar argument put forward by Angela 
Merkel who in 2010 declared that attempts at creating a multicultural society in Germany had 
‘utterly failed’. 
3  European Union electoral results for 2014: UKIP: 27.49  per cent, Labour: 25.40  per cent, 
Conservative: 23.93 per cent (see  http://www.europarl.org.uk/en/your-meps/european_elections.
html ). 
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regarding ethnic minority groups in the UK, focusing mainly on anti- 
Islamic sentiments and pointing out cultural divisions within society. 
Finally, the BNP is another acknowledged representative of the far-right 
scene in the country that has managed to attract the attention of the pub-
lic, especially under the leadership of Nick Griffi  n since the early 2000s. 
 Our research ocuses on hate speech and crime, such that the overall 
research question might be conceived as the relationship between the 
activities of political groups and individuals, and incidents of hate crimes 
and ‘othering’. We argue that although it seems questionable at present 
whether the existing far-right populist representatives can achieve greater 
electoral results (UKIP gained 12.6 per cent in the national elections of 
2015), the decline of class identity and the loss of faith in traditional ide-
ologies, along with controversy about Britain’s future with the European 
Union, the ongoing extended rhetoric of securitisation of migration in 
Britain, and the economic crisis, can still foment and give a new impetus 
to such groups. 
 Th e chapter is structured in three main parts. Th e fi rst section contex-
tualises the chapter theoretically (which includes a discussion of ‘majority 
identitarian populism’ and its impacts), outlines the rationale for choos-
ing EDL, BNP and UKIP as case-study groups, and the methods used 
for gathering our data. In this section a historical, socio-economic and 
political contextualisation is provided, which helps us understand the rise 
of such groups in the UK. Th e second section focuses on describing what 
they do and how they do it, raising questions of hierarchical control, 
response to opponents, and the diff erence between group and individual 
activists and supporters, and especially their diversity of thought and 
action. Th e third section focuses on counter-strategies by organisations 
that adopt the role of an ‘anti-body’ and ways they combat the phenom-
enon of majority identitarian populism. 
 Theoretical Context and Methodology 
 In recent studies the term ‘populism’ has created an ongoing debate 
between academics and has often been used as a synonym for far-right/
extreme-right politics, e.g. Rydgren ( 2003 ) on radical right populism, 
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Mudde ( 2004 ) and Taggart ( 2000 ) on new populist right, Laclau ( 2005 ) 
on right-wing populism or Fella and Ruzza ( 2009 ) on populist parties. 
 For the purpose of the research this chapter is based on ‘populism’ 
which is approached as a ‘thin ideology’ (Stanley  2008 ) and a resultant 
style of politics which presents society in terms of a confl ict between 
‘virtuous and homogeneous people’ and ‘a set of elites and dangerous 
“others”’ (Albertazzi and McDonnell  2008 : 3) who lie ‘outside the heart-
land’ (Zaslove  2008 : 323). In addition, according to Canovan ( 1999 : 3), 
populist movements along the political spectrum of left–right argue that 
‘the people’ have been excluded from power by ‘corrupt politicians and 
an unrepresentative elite’ who purposely ignore the interests and opin-
ions of the electorate. 
 Nevertheless, neither is this form of populism the sole preserve of 
particular groups and parties and nor is populism a synonym for the far 
right, extremism or fascism. ‘Majority identitarian populism’ (Johnson 
et al.  2005 ) can be identifi ed with more clarity in the approaches of 
mainstream parties in relation to immigration and multicultural-
ism (Bale et al.  2011 ), with arguments that an out-of-touch elite has 
allowed changes to British society which advantage newcomers over 
settled Britons: these are sometimes, but not always, done as ‘dog 
whistles’. Majority identitarian populism focuses on the concept of 
identity as a tool for determining who belongs to what they see as the 
‘majority group’, based on a number of characteristics, e.g., religion, or 
ethnicity creating a status where the ‘other’ stands against the ‘mass’. 
 Taken thus, such populism cannot be what defi nes a particular indi-
vidual or group as far right or extreme right. Th e ideological heterogeneity 
(Anastasakis  2000 ) of far right has created a continuing discussion about 
the defi nition and terminology of this political family. Th e debate includes 
approaches on whether and how a particular group should be categorised 
as fascist, radical or extremist, with the ‘ideological core’  and/or the break-
ing of democratic norms (i.e., violence) as indicators (see Carter  2005 ; 
Eatwell and Goodwin  2010 ; Richardson  2011 ). Studies of the electoral 
success of groups like the BNP (for examples, see Ford  2010 ; John et al. 
 2006 ) are, however, more concerned with the populist politics part of their 
activity than with the core ideology or relationship to violence. For Eatwell 
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( 2004 ) similarities with certain conservative policies raise questions about 
whether a clear line can be drawn between extremist and radical right. For 
Barker ( 1981 ) the reason is a form of ‘new racism’ that is not promulgating 
the old type of racism based on ideas of inferiority and superiority between 
racial groups but in contrast emphasises the group solidarity and exclusion 
of those seen as outsiders. Th is ‘new racism’ according to May et al. ( 2004 : 
223) does not ‘construct an explicit racial hierarchy but rather an immu-
table fi xed and organic belonging of specifi c people, territories and states 
that in eff ect excludes and racialises all “others”’. 
 Th at said, and given the research focus on populism and hate speech 
and crime, we raise the empirical question of the relationship between 
this populist politics and hate incidents. Any relationship could have 
multiple forms, including those practising populist politics moving 
towards illegal methods or inciting others, or the more diff use pos-
sibility that populist calls (by mainstream or non-mainstream politi-
cians) can give others a licence to express hate. Indeed, while some 
opponents of the BNP argue that BNP activity increases hate crime, 
others (Clark et al.  2008 ; Koopmans  1996 ; Painter  2013 ) argue that it 
acts as a safety valve, allowing racist and other discontent a democratic 
outlet that might otherwise be channelled into non-democratic activ-
ity. It is important here to also note that the UK has ‘developed the 
most comprehensive and systematic approach to policing racist crime 
and violence’ in the EU (Oakley  2005 ), such that some incitement can 
and is prosecuted as a criminal off ence. We are therefore mindful of 
the narrow band of ambiguous activity that is not illegal but may cre-
ate a climate of fear and distrust where violence becomes more likely 
(Smith  2008 ). 
 It is this context that makes the EDL, BNP and UKIP contrasting 
case studies. Anti-racist activists accuse all three of problematic activity, 
with organisations such as HopeNotHate asking its supporters in 2013 
whether UKIP should be added to the BNP and EDL as organisations it 
automatically campaigns against (Hope Not Hate  2013 ). At the time of 
writing, UKIP is both populist and popular. Th e EDL is populist but not 
popular, arguing that mainstream politicians ignore the threat from radi-
cal Islamism and Islam more generally, but EDL street demonstrations 
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usually only attracting a few hundred people, and a maximum of 3,000 
(Bartlett and Littler  2011 ). While UKIP and BNP 4 carry on their elec-
toral activities, with occasional disruption from anti-racist or anti-fascist 
activists, the EDL demonstrations are heavily policed in order to avoid 
confrontation between EDL and opposition activists. 5 Th is too may have 
an impact on how these forms of populist activism develop, both on 
particular occasions and over time, and how they are viewed by those 
engaged in them, those opposing them and those merely observing them. 
 Th is chapter examines the selected cases through fi eldwork that 
concentrates on the perspectives of those who are active within popu-
list politics against the ‘others’. Fieldwork included analysis of parties’ 
websites, looking at discourses and symbols, participant observation and 
semi-structured in-depth face-to-face interviews with members of EDL, 
UKIP and BNP as well as with representatives of groups who work with 
minority populations, that is those who are ‘othered’, and ‘anti-body’ 
organisations. 
 Before examining the main factors leading to the increasing popularity 
of far-right politics in the UK, we will briefl y look at the socio-economic 
and political context that provided fertile ground for the groups under 
analysis. We will then proceed with an analysis of their political mobility 
and ability to respond to the demands of the public by adopting a popu-
list discourse and proposing aggressive policies on issues like immigration 
and the EU. 
4  BNP publicly promotes violence in order to gain ‘institutionalized power’ (Heitmeyer  2003 : 406). 
5  As Hilary Pilkington writes in her blog ( http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/when-is-a-kettle-
not- a-kettle-when-it-is-on-slow-boil/ ), a few years ago, during an EDL demonstration in 
Walthamstow, East London, around 600 EDL demonstrators found themselves on the receiving 
end of a barrage of eggs thrown by counter-demonstrators; they were surrounded for hours by 
police without access to water, food or toilets and, before fi nally being released, they were arrested 
en masse under Section 60 of the Criminal Justice Act (breach of the peace), regardless of whether 
there was any evidence that individuals had participated in any public order off ence. Th e result was 
that many demonstrators declared they would never again attend a demonstration. 
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 Economic and Socio-Political and Cultural 
Background in the UK: The Effect of Economic 
Policy Trends on Views on Diversity 
 It was by the early 1980s that Britain was arguably one of the most ethni-
cally diverse countries in the world (see Jeff eries  2005 ). As Jeff eries ( 2005 ) 
underlined, the more recent waves of immigration have seen the termi-
nologies of ‘refugee’ and ‘illegal immigrant’ become deeply engrained 
in the popular imagination and our actors, the press and popular poll-
ing have come to construct Muslim immigration on the one hand and 
Eastern European migration on the other as particular problems. 
 Th e major recession (1979 to the mid-1980s) prior to the ‘big bang’ of 
the devolution of fi nancial services, next to the Great Depression of the 
1930s and the fi nancial crisis of 2008–2015, represented the deepest loss 
of industrial capacity and social cohesion in British history. Rapid and 
sustained de-industrialisation was accompanied by very substantial job 
losses and rapidly rising infl ation. At the time, these economic pressures 
generated remarkably little ethnic tension. Indeed, the fact that the BNP 
was formed in 1982 as a splinter group from the fascist National Front, 
speaks to the fact that these conditions created real tensions amongst the 
ranks of far-right groups themselves. 
 Th e deregulation of fi nancial services in the mid-1980s gave a widely 
acknowledged boost to local and regional economies; it laid the founda-
tions for selective urban investment (the rebuilding of the urban centres of 
Liverpool and Leeds, for instance), low unemployment and a pronounced 
upward social mobility. Low average unemployment, notably in the south 
of England (see Demman and McDonald  1996 ) emboldened a political 
class to begin to move legislatively on LGBT issues. Inter- community 
tensions based on religion, skin colour or origin were moderate during 
this period. From 1999 the BNP dropped much of its rhetoric of bio-
logical racism and adopted a rhetoric which linked its core message to 
identity at the national and local levels (see Eatwell  2004 ). 
 With rising south Asian chain migration, towns and cities such as 
Leicester, Bradford, Burnley and Liverpool become both poor and 
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 visibly non-white. Th is has had long-term implications for the national 
psyche and underpins some of the campaigning agenda of modern far- 
right organisations which have focused both their resources and their 
national message on the threat posed in which ‘whites’ might become a 
minority before 2070, an opinion supported by David Coleman from the 
Migration Observatory (Coleman  2010 ). 
 Nevertheless, as in many European countries, the fi nancial crisis is 
a dominant issue in UK politics, followed by government’s austerity- 
motivated policies. 6 Stripping out economic growth funded by the unsus-
tainable accumulation of debt, the British economy barely grew between 
1997 and 2015. Th e end of social mobility in the late 2000s created ten-
sions within faith and migrant communities (between diff erent ethnic 
groups and between the generations within ethnic groups) as it did between 
these groups and far-right populist groups. Th is does much to explain the 
sustained rise of groups such as UKIP, BNP and EDL, the latter focusing 
primarily on the threat that migration poses to ‘our’ (the British) state. 
 From the Past to the Present: Far-Right 
Populism in the UK 
 Th e most successful post-war representative of the far-right scene in the 
UK, the National Front (NF) was formed in 1967. Despite denying 
accusations of fascism, the party was linked with neo-Nazi movements 
within the UK (e.g. Blood and Honour UK and British Movement) and 
abroad and was associated with the strong xenophobic nationalist rhet-
oric advocating biological racism and opposed non-white immigration 
that still underlines that ‘the multiracial Commonwealth is a farcical relic 
of an unfortunate past which should be disbanded’ (NF  2015 ). Although 
NF managed to attract minority support at local level, the party would 
be proved incapable of gaining any form of electoral success (Eatwell 
 2004 ). In the general elections of 1979, with 303 candidates, the party 
managed to attract 0.6 per cent of the popular vote, which was to be 
6  For more, see David Cameron, Age of Austerity, 2009:  http://www.conservatives.com/News/
Speeches/2009/04/Th e_age_of_austerity_speech_to_the_2009_Spring_Forum.aspx . 
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the highest performance in the party’s history. NF declined towards its 
gradual extinction in the mid-1990s, despite eff orts to revive the party by 
Ian Anderson in 1995. Nevertheless, it was in the mid-1990s and early 
2000s that the far-right populism mobilisation started to emerge on the 
British political scene. 
 Formed in 1982 as a fragment from the NF (Goodwin  2011 ), BNP 
under the leadership of John Tyndall, former leader of NF, and of Nick 
Griffi  n since 1999, dominated the far-right scene for almost a decade, 
by adopting a more moderate populist profi le, abandoning extreme lan-
guage and biological racist rhetoric (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 
 2010 ), similar to later eff orts of other far-right parties in Europe e.g. 
Marine Le Pen and the French Front National or Gianfranco Fini and 
the Italian MSI. However, despite the eff orts of Tyndall to distinguish 
the newly formed party from its predecessor NF and from links to neo- 
Nazi movements, BNP would still be identifi ed with neo-Nazism, rac-
ism, violence and rhetoric on denial of the facts of the Holocaust. Th e 
party started participating in the general and local elections in 1983 but 
it was not until 1993 that it achieved its fi rst electoral success when Derek 
Beackon was elected as a councillor in Millwall, London. 
 Th e change of leadership in 1999 would signify a modernisation 
reform of the party, with Griffi  n isolating the extremist elements and 
transforming BNP into a more moderate version of the far right, closer to 
similar parties in other European countries, e.g., Italy and France. In the 
local elections of 2002 the party managed to gain three seats on Burnley 
Council and continued increasing its popularity in the following years; 
in the European elections of 2004 it won 4.9 per cent of the vote. It is 
between the years 2008 and 2010 that the party reached its highest rates 
of popularity, with Richard Barnbrook winning a seat in 2008 on the 
London Assembly, and in the following European elections of 2009 it 
managed to win two seats in the European Parliament by gaining 6.3 per 
cent of the popular vote. 
 BNP is self-identifi ed as British nationalist with fundamental core val-
ues which call for national and cultural regeneration (BNP  2005 ). Under 
Griffi  n’s leadership the party has focused its rhetoric on ethnic national-
ism, anti-immigration policies and opposition to Islam and the alerting 
threat of multiculturalism, claiming that white people will be ‘ethnically 
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cleansed’ and calling for an ‘immediate halt to all further immigration’ 
(BNP  2005 ). Th e economic policy of the party is to oppose globalism, 
economic liberalism and  laissez-faire capitalism (BNP  2005 ). In addition, 
among other policies, BNP advocates harsher sentences for criminals, 
opposes same-sex marriage, embraces tradition, heritage and civility and 
is opposed to European integration (BNP  2005 ). 
 Nonetheless, regardless of the eff orts to renovate it to a more modern-
ist party, the BNP failed to maintain its success (see Goodwin  2011 ). For 
Hainsworth ( 2008 ), several reasons have managed to prevent an electoral 
breakthrough like that of far-right counterparts in other European coun-
tries, e.g., Denmark or the Netherlands: poor leadership, the anti-fascist 
tradition in Britain, internal divisions between representatives of the far 
right in the country and the associations of far-right groups with violence 
and street politics (Hainsworth  2008 ). Similarly, for Eatwell, despite the 
fact that there have been developments in the country that could have 
favoured racial and extreme nationalist policies, such as increasing migra-
tion rates, increasing unemployment, the decadency of urban centres and 
opposition to European integration, the conditions for possible success of 
far-right groups would include the legitimacy of the group, increasing per-
sonal eff ectiveness and a strong decline in confi dence in the system, fac-
tors that have proved insuffi  cient in the case of Britain (2004: 325–330). 
 Formed by Alan Sked in 1993, and successor to the Anti-Federalist 
League, UKIP was set up to oppose the 1992 Maastricht Treaty which 
was supported by all three main political parties (see Daniel  2005 ). By 
focusing on opposing European integration and by developing popu-
lar far-right policies, the party managed to steadily increase its support 
from 0.3 per cent of the vote in the general elections of 1997 to 12.6 per 
cent in the latest general election in 2015; in the European elections 
of 2014, the party gained 27.5 per cent of the popular vote to became 
the strongest party in the country at the time. After a series of changes 
in leadership the party, under Nigel Farage, successfully increased its 
visibility from what Ford and Goodwin described as ‘a large angry bear’, 
that ‘would stumble out of hibernation once every few years, briefl y stir 
up popular discontent with Brussels and Westminster political elites, and 
then return to their slumbers’ (Ford and Goodwin,  2014 : 2). With a mix-
ture of xenophobia, nationalism, Euroscepticism and populist rhetoric, 
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UKIP managed to address the concerns of the electorate and provide a 
moderate alternative compared to the BNP, thereby establishing its place 
on the national scene. 
 UKIP’s constitution states that the UK shall cease to be a member of 
the EU and shall not thereafter make any treaty or join any international 
organisation that involves in any way the surrender of any part of the 
UK’s sovereignty in order for the country to ‘be governed by her own 
citizens and that its governance shall at all times be conducted fi rst and 
foremost in the interests of the UK and its peoples’ (UKIP  2012 ). In 
addition to encouraging withdrawal from the EU, in its recent manifesto 
of 2015 UKIP argues in favour of a political reformation to ensure that 
the ‘government answers properly to Parliament and that Parliament is 
accountable to the people’ (UKIP  2015 ), invoking populist appeals to 
show that the party stands for the ‘people’s’ interests. In addition to the 
party’s positions in favour of a reformation of the political system, UKIP 
underlines its role as a challenger to the established political parties. In 
essence, UKIP’s anti-establishment credentials are illustrated by the belief 
that all mainstream parties are the same (UKIP  2013 ). 
 More specifi cally, based on Abedi’s ( 2004 : 12) criteria, (a party that 
challenges the status quo in terms of major policy and political system 
issues, that perceives itself as a challenger to the established political 
parties and that asserts that a fundamental divide between the political 
establishment and the people exists), UKIP can be characterised as an 
anti-political establishment party. An anti-political establishment party 
puts emphasis on the argument that the organisation of the party should 
be based on democratic values and demand direct involvement of the 
electorate in the decision-making process. Self-identifi ed as a democratic 
libertarian party, UKIP argues in favour of a liberal economy, demands 
the repeal of the Human Rights Act and the removal of Britain from both 
the European Convention on Refugees and the European Convention on 
Human Rights, embraces patriotism against the threat of multiculturalism 
and asks for a political reformation in order for politics to reconnect with 
the people (UKIP  2015 ). As Nigel Farage stated in 2006: ‘We’re going to 
be a party fi ghting on a broad range of domestic policies and together if 
we’re united and disciplined we will become the real voice of opposition 
in British politics’. He continued arguing that ‘on the big issues of the 
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day you cannot put a cigarette paper between the three major parties’ and 
played the populist card, emphasising that although people tend to ‘place 
us as being right of centre, I would place us as being in the centre of public 
opinion’ (BBC  2006 ). 
 Th e EDL was formed by Tommy Robinson in 2009, as a response to 
a demonstration against the war in Afghanistan, organised by the local 
Luton group of Al-Muhajiroun (an international and later banned organ-
isation). Th e newly formed group focused its attention in two primary 
purposes: to draw attention to the growing threat of Islamic extremism 
in the UK and work towards the elimination of such propensities. A 
single issue-oriented protest movement, focusing on anti-Islamic senti-
ments in a greater eff ort to ‘protect the inalienable rights of all people to 
protest against radical Islam’s encroachment into the lives of non-Mus-
lims’ (EDL’s Mission Statement  2015 ), EDL since its emergence has con-
ducted numerous demonstrations across the country and succeeded in 
sustaining the public’s attention despite accusations of violent acts, anti-
social behaviour, racism and hate crimes. For Pilkington ( 2014 ) EDL’s 
slogan ‘Not racist, not violent, just no longer silent’ motivates EDL’s sup-
porters in ‘speaking out’ and ‘standing strong’ in contrast to the ‘politics 
of silencing’ supported by the social distance between ‘politicians’ and the 
‘people’ and cultural limitations on ‘acceptable’ issues for debate. 7 
 Following the argument of Betz ( 2007 ) who underlines the sustained 
focus on Islamophobia across numerous European far-right parties, e.g., 
Switzerland, the Netherlands and Denmark, EDL off ered an alternative 
on the far-right scene in the UK, suggesting selective multiculturalism 
and engaging pro-LGBT approaches. Th at said, drawing in other issues 
besides extremism—‘denigration and oppression of women, the moles-
tation of young children, the committing of so-called honour killings, 
homophobia, anti-Semitism’ (EDL Mission Statement  2015 )—does 
lead to a focus on Islam more generally as these issues are not limited 
to radical Islamists, and of course not to Islam either. For Bartlett and 
Littler ( 2011 : 11), EDL attempts to moderate its political agenda (by 
supporting Israel, deriding racism and employing human-rights talk) and 
7  Pilkington has conducted ethnographic research on EDL under the auspices of the MYPLACE 
project. For more information see  https://myplacefp7.wordpress.com/ . 
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style (by advocating for less violence), which some factions felt was a sign 
of weakness. Other early supporters of the EDL have left to join more 
aggressively anti-Islam groups, feeling that the EDL has lost focus on 
fi ghting Islamism. 
 What diff erentiates EDL from UKIP and BNP to an even greater 
extent is the use of media for the purpose of communicating to the pub-
lic. By using a wide range of social media, especially Facebook, EDL has 
managed to organise campaigns, cultivate street protests and other forms 
of direct action and organise its supporters by using online culture to 
promote its populist nationalist ideology (Jackson  2011 ). 
 Communication Strategies, Charismatic 
Leadership, Insignia and Beyond 
 In terms of structure and leadership, there are noticeable diff erences 
between the three groups. While UKIP and BNP follow a more typi-
cal party-political structure, including democratic procedures such as 
elected leadership, annual conferences and a number of active commit-
tees accountable for the party’s policies, EDL has no formal membership 
and thus, it is diffi  cult to calculate the number of its supporters. When 
it comes to the leadership, since 1993 UKIP has experienced more than 
seven changes in its highest offi  ce, with former leaders often turning their 
back on the party, a reaction that can be found in both BNP and EDL 
former leaderships. In the case of EDL for example, the founding leaders 
(Tommy Robinson and Kevin Carroll) decided to leave the group and 
work with Quilliam, a Muslim-led counter- extremism think tank, itself 
led by ex-Hizb ut-Tahrir 8 activists, arguing that the EDL was becoming 
a home for far-right extremists (BBC News  2013 ). For all three, BNP, 
UKIP and the EDL, the group and the individual members change over 
time, with the degree of fi t at least partially determining who leaves and 
who remains. Th is fi t is, of course, relational: those  leaving UKIP, for 
example, will include some like Alexandra Swann who see the party as too 
8  Th is is an international pan-Islamic political organisation founded in 1953. Th eir goal is for all 
Muslim countries to unify as an Islamic state ruled by  sharia law. 
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‘socially conservative’ and others such as Paul Weston of Liberty GB (an 
anti-fundamentalist, anti-immigration political party formed in 2013) 9 
who considers the party to be too soft on the issue of Islam. 
 Nevertheless, the public personas of Nigel Farage and Nick Griffi  n 
appear to be one of the most infl uential factors when it comes to attract-
ing voters in the case of UKIP and BNP. Th e personality of the party 
leader is crucial when it comes to the identity of the party, as in the face of 
the leader the voter sees what the party represents; it appears that Farage 
and Griffi  n have managed to create a fi gure to which the electorate can 
relate. As strong charismatic demagogues and populist leaders, Farage 
and Griffi  n, in combination with a successful reformation of the public 
images of their parties, have led both UKIP and BNP to a new era and 
contributed to their electoral success. It is the perception of the value 
of the party leader, and the level of their eff ectiveness in convincing the 
electorate of their party’s worth, that creates a strong factor at the disposal 
of the party’s communication strategy. 
 Apart from the fi gure of the leader, a valuable element of the commu-
nication strategies of the groups under examination is their insignia, since 
what defi nes them is more than just a logo, a political message, a name or 
a personality, but rather a combination of all four. 
 Th e UKIP logo is a pound sign (£), with many activists wearing a gold 
lapel badge, opposition to the Euro being obviously necessary to the  party’s 
euro-scepticism. Another symbol used is the pint of beer and the  fag 
 (cigarette): a number of young activists we interviewed mentioned the 
pint as something that should be in one’s hand. Party leader Nigel Farage’s 
most obvious image is that of being in the pub with a pint of bitter or a 
cigarette in his hand, or both. With its references to elements of British 
culture, this plays into ideas of Britishness, the ordinary against the elite 
and freedom from bureaucracy (UKIP would repeal the smoking ban). 
On occasion UKIP have been described as the ‘BNP in blazers’ (Hinsliff  
 2004 ): in reality, party activists are largely to be seen in business attire. 
 Unlike UKIP, EDL (and its off shoots) has a plethora of distinctive 
symbols and imagery deployed by its activists. Th e EDL logo appears 
9  Its Facebook page describes it as ‘patriotic counter-jihad party for Christian civilisation, Western 
rights and freedoms, British culture, animal welfare and capitalism’. 
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online and on pin badges and clothing, and is a Christian cross with the 
Latin  in hoc signo vinces (‘in this sign you will conquer’) written below. 
Alongside this, their online presence often features images of medieval 
knights, a direct reference to the Crusades. Having said that, as stated 
earlier, an interesting point is that EDL has its origins in demonstrations 
against the radical Islamist Al-Muhajiroun, 10 which itself used images of 
the Crusades. 
 At demonstrations, the primary offl  ine activity of the EDL, the most 
visible symbol is the fl ag of St George (red cross on a white background). 
Th is is combined with slogans and symbols which reference Islam (‘No 
Sharia’, ‘No more mosques’), and the British military (‘Support our 
troops’) and sometimes slogans which aim to distance the group from 
racism and extremism (‘Patriotism does not equal Nazism’). Th e refer-
ences to the military refl ect the fact that the British military are engaged 
in operations against Islamic groups overseas, and more importantly, 
are a response to al-Muhajiroun and its successor organisations’ pro-
tests against the military. Th us, the use of the poppy image was a direct 
response to the radical Islamists’ burning of a poppy on Remembrance 
Sunday 2010 (BBC News  2010b ). 
 Th e BNP’s logo, on the other hand, is a direct reference to the party’s 
ethno-nationalist and British-nationalist character: a Union fl ag-infi lled 
heart with the party’s name. According to Griffi  n, the new logo ‘illustrated 
exactly what the party is about’ (BNP  2015 ), replacing the Union fl ag- 
infi lled ‘BNP’ logo that was previously used. Th e new insignia, according 
to Derek Adams, ‘softens the image a bit which is what we need’. 
 What is signifi cantly important in all three cases is the contempo-
rary use of new media and online spaces as part of their communica-
tion strategies, leading to what Jackson and Gable ( 2011 ) describe as 
a ‘revolutionised extremist activity’. Online networks like Twitter and 
Facebook have been created, off ering a space for public discussion, both 
measured and crude, and attract comments from all sides of the debate. 
In other words, a public forum is being created for policing by campaign-
ers, defacement by opponents and disagreement within the groups’ sup-
10  Th is is a terrorist organisation that was based in Britain and has been linked to international ter-
rorism, homophobia and anti-Semitism. It was banned in 2005. 
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port base. As Jackson and Gable ( 2011 ), in their research on  Nationalism 
extremism on the internet point out, BNP encouraged members to engage 
with social networks in order to proclaim their political dogma and 
declare their party affi  liation, whereas in the case of EDL, as previously 
stated, the group has managed to mobilise large parts of its supporters to 
participate in direct activities but has also explored the internet to create 
online networks with other organisations and groups. 
 Ideologies, Values and Rhetoric in Perspective 
 Mudde (2005) suggests that to identify as far right someone has to focus 
on key elements, such as nationalism, xenophobia, racism and immigra-
tion, that appear to be referenced more frequently than other elements 
in the discourse on right groups in Europe. Mudde’s (2004) approach, 
along with Norris’ ( 2005 ) theory on market-oriented elements of supply 
and demand in relation to the public’s needs, could provide an extended 
explanation for the rise of far-right populist parties in the UK. 
 Our analysis of the three groups under examination and the interviews 
we conducted clarify the perception of the concept of cultural identity 
and its relations to the ‘other’; in that sense, representation can be related 
to various versions of stereotypes such as gender (see de Beauvoir  1971 ), 
race (see Hage  2010 ) or religion (see Said  1978 ). In Gillespie’s ( 2006 ) 
view, ‘othering’ leads people to diff erentiate in-group from out-group 
and Self from Other. In the case of EDL, UKIP and BNP, one of the 
main focuses in constructing the image of the ‘other’ is migrants, with 
an additional focus on Islam as a threat to British cultural identity. For 
Minkenberg ( 2002 ), radicalising ethnic, cultural and political criteria of 
exclusion serves to construct the nationwith an image of extreme collec-
tive homogeneity (2002: 337). Th is perception addresses the elements of 
nationalism, xenophobia and racism, which are strong in all three cases.
 As I look ahead, I am fi lled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see 
‘the River Tiber foaming with much blood’. Th at tragic and intractable 
phenomenon which we watch with horror on the other side of the Atlantic 
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but which there is interwoven with the history and existence of the States 
itself, is coming upon us here by our own volition and our own neglect. 
Indeed, it has all but come. In numerical terms, it will be of American 
proportions long before the end of the century. Only resolute and urgent 
action will avert it even now. Whether there will be the public will to 
demand and obtain that action, I do not know. All I know is that to see, 
and not to speak, would be the great betrayal. (Powell  1968 ) 
 In his ‘rivers of blood’ speech ( 1968 ), Powell underlined that Britain must 
be ‘mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual infl ow of some 50,000 
dependents, who are for the most part the material of the future growth of 
the immigrant-descended population. It is like watching a nation busily 
engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre.’ Nigel Farage, in an interview 
in  Th e Guardian , said of Enoch Powell: ‘Enoch Powell was an extraor-
dinary fellow. I admired him for having the guts to talk about an issue 
that seemed to be really rather important—immigration, society, how do 
we want to live in this country’ (Farage  2009 ). Powell’s approach sum-
marises Barker’s ( 1981 ) argument on ‘new racism’ and correlates with the 
understanding of a form of nationalism linked to a cultural sensibility in 
Britain. From this perspective, racism, although it started as an ideology 
forming prejudice against people of colour (Fryer  2010 ), has managed 
to evolve from biological inferiority to cultural racism, anti-immigrant 
racism and Islamophobia, focusing on cultural diff erences, an approach 
popularly engaged by British political discourse since the early 1980s. 
 Th ere is no doubt that some UKIP interviewees exhibit ‘othering’ atti-
tudes and behaviour, whether as part of political campaigning or not, but 
this is not unique to them. Surveys used to examine far-right supporters’ 
attitudes fi nd that those attitudes stereotypically associated with the far 
right are widespread among mainstream voters too. For instance a 2009 
survey suggests that 13 per cent of UK adults—6.5 million—think that 
black people are intellectually inferior, and 26 per cent—13 million—
opposed civil partnerships (Cutts et al.  2011 ). Th ese numbers surpass the 
numbers voting BNP or even UKIP, and while they can be characterised 
as potential support for BNP or UKIP, they also demonstrate that such 
attitudes are compatible with mainstream voting. 
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 Analysis of parties of the far right (see Mudde  2004 ) shows xeno-
phobic sentiments, underlines the threat of mass immigration and the 
potential creation of a multicultural society, and proposes strict immi-
gration control and asylum policies. In France, since the early 1970s 
the Front National has adopted an anti-immigration rhetoric and called 
for ‘assisted repatriation’ (Hainsworth  2008 ); comparable examples 
are found in the Belgian Vlaams Blok, in the Italian Lega Nord, in the 
Swiss Schweizerische Volkspartei and in the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs, among others. Norris ( 2005 ) argues that immigration is the 
‘signature’ issue of the far right, and the fear of the ‘other’ that drives poli-
cies on immigration, asylum seekers and multiculturalism (2005: 132). 
Rejecting any form of multiculturalism is essential within far-right ide-
ology and is often the reason that far-right parties have been accused of 
racism. Nation and national identity along with an ethnic and religious 
homogeneity are seen as things that need to be protected and secured by 
any threat posed by, for example,asylum seekers, Muslims, immigrants. 
In addition, far-right groups ‘postulate a homogeneous society where 
national identity is passed on through blood and heredity’ (Hainsworth 
2000 in Moufahim  2007 : 31). 
 Having said that, as underlined by a number of interviewees, it is 
important to note that there is a diff erence between the feeling that Islam 
and/or Islamism are a threat to the British way of life and hating Muslims 
just because they are Muslims; focusing more on the threat of migra-
tion and more specifi cally of Muslims towards British cultural identity 
(‘Englishness’), one of the EDL activists we interviewed said:
 Other people say ‘I’m not particularly interested in the – in Englishness 
and that doesn’t really bother me that much – I’m concerned about Muslims 
and them changing our way of life and so there’s a whole – for some people 
Englishness is important, some it isn’t, some think religion is important, 
some– ‘ah- it’s not so much about religion’- some people are really attached 
to the Christianity identity – some people see themselves as being  atheists – 
so there’s an interesting hotch potch of people who end up basically, 
becoming friends who become part of a network. (EDL4) 
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 Th e offi  cial EDL website warns against ‘the unjust assumption that 
all Muslims are complicit in or somehow responsible for these crimes’ 
and describes Muslims themselves as the ‘victims of some Islamic tradi-
tions and practices’ (EDL Mission Statement  2015 ). Similarly to EDL’s 
approach, although UKIP in its 2010 manifesto rejected ‘blood and soil’ 
ethnic nationalism, it promoted the notion of ‘uniculturalism’ in opposi-
tion to multiculturalism and political correctness; in other words a united 
British culture that embraces all the races, colours and religions (UKIP 
 2010 ). BNP also claims not to be ‘against Islam per se’ but additionally 
signifi es the potential danger posed to ‘democracy, traditions and free-
doms by the creeping Islamifi cation of Britain’ (BNP  2005 ). Nevertheless, 
a video released by the youth of BNP in 2014 creates a clear perception of 
the immigrant as the ‘other’. 11 
 Immigration rhetoric incorporating strong sentiments of xenophobia is 
among the most characteristic themes of the far right, with a distinguish-
ing popular appeal within the electorate, something that can be identi-
fi ed in the groups under examination. Xenophobia, literally refl ecting the 
fear (phobia) of the foreigner (xenos), is the sentiment in which far-right 
populist parties invest and ground their proposals of welfare-nationalist 
policies and anti-immigration measures (see Davies and Lynch 2002 in 
Moufahim  2007 ). 12 
 Since the majority of immigrants originate from non-Western European 
countries, as Mudde ( 2002 ) observes, they are regarded as a threat to the 
cultural identity of the host countries and, therefore, are often accused 
of exploiting the welfare system, taking jobs away from native citizens 
and being responsible for the rising crime rate. In the interviews we con-
ducted, while some described themselves as against uncontrolled mass 
migration but not against immigration as a whole, others were calling 
11  BNP Youth—Real Version, Retrieved 2 May 2015 from  https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=q2snwxSGn-Y . 
12  A detailed analysis of xenophobia and immigration can be found in Betz ( 1994 ),  Radical Right 
Wing Populism in Western Europe. New York: St. Martin’s Press. pp. 69–106. 
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for a stop to migration until issues such as access to health and education 
services and the cost of interpreters were resolved.
 Th e problem we have at the moment being in the EU, millions of people 
can claim benefi ts if they want. Th ey haven’t got a skill, they, they’re not 
coming to work. (UKIP 4) 
 If you’re going to come here and work and benefi t the country and your 
community, I don’t have a problem. But if you’re going to come here just 
to sponge benefi ts and demand your laws and start breaking our laws, that’s 
what we’ve got a problem with. (EDL2) 
 In addition, the homogeneity of the nation refl ects issues like welfare 
chauvinism. Th e socio-economic policy of welfare chauvinism introduces 
a notion of ‘our own people fi rst’, an exclusionist approach adopted by 
the entirety of far-right parties. Based on this principle, the state’s funds 
job opportunities should be used by natives, rather than immigrants, and 
along with that the state should protect the national economy against 
‘foreign competition’ (Mudde  2002 : 175). 
 Another approach to identifying their ideological content is to exam-
ine the slogans used by the groups. A common slogan in EDL’s dem-
onstrations, for instance, is ‘No Surrender’, or NFSE (standing for ‘No 
Fucking Surrender Ever’). Th is harks back to the use of the phrase in 
Northern Irish politics (see Wallis et al.  1986 ) and its appearance in foot-
ball songs in 1980s England as ‘No surrender to the IRA’. Th is football 
song has been adapted to ‘No surrender to the Taliban’, and is sung at 
EDL demonstrations alongside other football-related songs, including 
‘England ’til I die’. Another EDL slogan, seen on the back of many EDL 
shirts, is ‘Not racist, not violent, no longer silent’. Th e fi rst two parts of 
this are a direct refutation of the accusations made by opponents such as 
HopeNotHate and Unite Against Fascism, and mainstream commenta-
tors (see below). For the EDL, the people of Britain have been silent for 
too long on the question of the threat of Islam and/or Islamism, targeting 
the government which ‘they perceive as pandering to Jihadis’ demands, 
drowned in political correctness and marred by indefensible double stan-
dards’ (Bartlett and Littler  2011 : 12–13) and demanding direct action. 
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 Similarly, UKIP’s ‘Believe in Britain’ or ‘Love Britain’ (a slogan that 
was used also by BNP in 2010) are targeting the voter’s sentimental 
attachment to the country and emphasising the element of nationalism. 
Defending ethno-nationalism, the representatives of the far right argue 
for a homogeneous environment in which the nation is consistent with 
the state (Eatwell  2000 ). Th us they disregard or belittle any foreign ele-
ments that are diff erentiated from it. Th is refers back to the idea that the 
nation, for EDL, UKIP and BNP, is perceived as a unit that shares iden-
tical cultural and ethnic origins, and individuals that do not share these 
features should not be considered as part of it. 
 What diff erentiates EDL, however, from both UKIP and BNP is 
the openness of the group to other issues, specifi cally to their Jewish, 
LGBT, Sikh and Hindu divisions (Lane  2012 ). Th is promotion has a 
triple meaning: fi rst, these groups have been the target of Islamist groups 
globally (the latter two in Indian Gujarat), thus there is an expression of 
solidarity; second, EDL activists know that the rainbow fl ag and Israeli 
fl ag represent things that the radical Islamists hate, so it acts as a ‘wind-
 up’; and third, it is also an attempt to demonstrate that the group is not 
fascist or extreme right. Although the genuineness of each motive can be 
questioned, the interviews showed that it appears to be enough to con-
vince some gay EDL activists.
 Tommy and Kev [were] told us, ‘We don’t care if you’re black, if you’re gay, 
if you’re lesbian or whatever religious path you follow, if you want to join 
us to fi ght against Islamic extremism we’ll take you’ … I fi rst met some 
lesbians and some gays and some bi-sexuals and transgenders, we all met 
up at London when Geert Wilders came over. And we thought to our-
selves, why don’t we set up an LGBT division? (EDL2) 
 Julia Gasper, the Oxford UKIP chairman, made online comments on a pri-
vate members’ forum linking homosexuality and paedophilia and also claim-
ing ‘some homosexuals prefer sex with animals’ (Moss  2013 ). However, the 
party’s position on gay marriage is not necessarily homophobic. Th e party 
offi  cially supports the civil partnership regime as a way of giving same-sex 
couples the same rights as all other couples, but fears a change to marriage 
law would pave the way for EU or UK law to interfere with the operation 
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of religious bodies (UKIP  2015 ), an approach that the interviewees seemed 
to agree with. ‘I mean a man, if two men want to go to the registrar and get 
married, it’s a doddle, I mean it’s the same with two women doing that, I 
can’t see it as a problem—that’s entirely up to them’ (UKIP1). 
 Moreover, BNP also opposes same-sex marriage and wishes to ban 
what it perceives as the promotion of homosexuality in schools and 
the media, which it calls ‘homosexual propaganda’. In 2014, the party’s 
youth released a recruitment video claiming that ‘militant homosexu-
als’ are part of an ‘unholy alliance’ taking charge of the country in order 
to destroy families. According to the video, homosexuality is linked to 
ongoing attempts to eradicate the British cultural identity and therefore 
poses a threat to the traditional family model and the Christian values of 
British society (Pink News  2014 ). Following the referendum in Ireland 
on same-sex marriage, Jean de Valette ( 2015 ) of the BNP wrote an article 
on the party’s website characterising same-sex marriage as a ‘madness to 
equality’, while Nick Griffi  n, in 2014, referring to the issue of same-sex 
marriage commented that:
 Same-sex marriage isn’t about rights of gay people. It’s fundamentally an 
attack by a Trotskyite Leftist and capitalist elite which wants the pink 
pound and the pink dollar. It’s an attack on marriage. It’s an attack on tra-
dition. It’s an attack on the fabric of our society. … Teach them about 
homosexuality? Th at’s not in any way for the rights of homosexuals. Th at’s 
some dirty pervert trying to mess with the minds of my kids and I think it’s 
great that a major European power has stood up and said: Leave our kids 
alone. 13 
 Opponents and Opposition: Anti-bodies 
Against the Politics of Fear 
 Th e past 20 years have seen some consolidation of state and community- 
sector organisations against the politics of fear spread by the far right. Th e 
backlash against Muslims post-2001 prompted responses from ant-racist 
13  Germany: Ukrainian nationalists are being used by the EU—Nick Griffi  n. Retrieved May 2, 
2015 from  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q6Ir2rWzkFk . 
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organisations and the government, notably with the ‘community cohe-
sion’ agenda as a framework for addressing confl ict. 
 While the asylum seekers issue, resulting in multiple pieces of legisla-
tion (Fletcher  2008 ), and the beginning of the debate over the treatment 
of Muslims and Islam (Khan  2000 ) were important aspects of the British 
experience of the 1990s, both were overshadowed by the enquiry into 
the racist murder of a 19-year-old black British man, Stephen Lawrence, 
which laid more blame at the door of public bodies than had previously 
been allowed, concluding that the Metropolitan Police was ‘institution-
ally racist’ and resulting in legislation which aimed to reform the public 
sector. 
 Previously, the government inquiry into the 1981 Brixton riots (the 
Scarman Report) had blamed the deprivation in the area (characterised 
by high unemployment, crime and poor housing) on some unwittingly 
racist police offi  cers. An overly restrictive defi nition of ‘institutional rac-
ism’ as consciously set up to be racist cleared the Metropolitan Police. 
However, the 1999 Macpherson Report (which resulted from the public 
enquiry into the Stephen Lawrence murder) reassessed this judgement 
in the light of the failed police investigation into the murder (see Lea 
 2000 for a critical discussion). Bell argues that the state response to this 
was, in part, the ‘mainstreaming’ of ‘ethnic equality issues’ in the Race 
Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 which placed … public authorities 
under a legally enforceable duty to have due regard to the need (a) to 
eliminate unlawful discrimination and (b) to promote equal opportunity 
and good relations between persons of diff erent racial groups. (Bell  2008 : 
47)A decade later, the 2010 Equality Act aimed to tidy up a number of 
pieces of legislation which did similar work for other sets of people with 
‘protected characteristics’. 
 After riots in various Northern towns and 9/11, ‘race relations’ more 
broadly was in eff ect reconfi gured and rebadged as ‘community cohe-
sion’ (Worley  2005 ). Of concern were both the state’s relationship with 
the Muslim minority (mainly those with a sub-continental background) 
and the revitalised far right, which was focused on the same minority. 
Th e Cantle Report (Cantle  2001 ) cemented the notion of ‘community 
cohesion’ as the framework for addressing confl ict, and an Institute of 
Community Cohesion was launched in 2005. As with the equalities 
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work associated with equalities legislation, local bodies in the public and 
voluntary sectors have staff  working in a variety of community cohesion 
interventions, including counter-extremism and counter-terrorism work 
which aims to reach those at risk of moving to violence. While this work 
has sometimes been characterised as Islamophobic and as stigmatising 
particular places and communities, recent years have seen attempts to 
conduct and demonstrate a balanced approach. In this vein, the state has 
also funded Muslim-led groups, such as TellMAMA, which monitor hate 
speech. 
 While hate speech and other hate crimes are dealt with in separate 
pieces of legislation for each characteristic, new laws have attempted 
to put diff erent types of hate on a par, with laws made in 2006 and 
2008 creating new off ences of ‘stirring up religious hatred’ and ‘inciting 
hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation’. Fella and Bozzini found 
that most respondents in the UK believe that EU anti-racist policy 
has had little impact on the UK as its ‘legislation was clearly the most 
advanced in Europe’ (Fella and Bozzini  2013 : 72), with EU policy play-
ing catch-up. 
 Th is, of course, begs the question of the impact of such laws. Seemingly 
part of the response to EU initiatives, in 2007 the Commission for Racial 
Equality (CRE) was merged with other equalities bodies to create the 
Equalities and Human Rights Commission (Fella and Bozzini  2013 : 73). 
Similarly, many of the Racial Equality Councils—local versions of the 
CRE with links to local government—have been reconfi gured to cover 
a range of discriminations, being renamed [locality] Rights and Equality 
Council or Equality Council. Th ese bodies continue to provide legal and 
social support to those discriminated against in the workplace or else-
where, and to the victims of harassment and crime. Th ese changes, and 
the post-2001 focus on religious divides and discrimination, have led 
some activists to see race as sliding down the priority list. 
 Th e brief success of the BNP in the mid-2000s, and later the emer-
gence of the EDL (see previous sections), also revitalised the anti-fascist 
movement. Th is includes the campaigning and research work of organ-
isations such as HopeNotHate (HnH 14 ), and campaigning and counter- 
14  Th is is an advocacy group, created in 2004, that campaigns to counter racism and fascism. 
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demonstrations by Unite Against Fascism (UAF). Th e end of the 2000s 
also saw a number of Love Music Hate Racism events, continuing in the 
tradition of the Rock Against Racism events of the 1970s. However, the 
failure of the BNP to achieve long-lasting success has led UAF to focus 
on opposing the EDL, with the ‘None Shall Pass’ approach of the 1930s 
and 1970s, while HnH have broadened their work to oppose UKIP in 
Project Purple Rain; by combining research with community organisa-
tion, HnH aims to raise the profi le of extremism and work against hate 
groups. 
 In parallel to these developments, the 1990s onwards saw the increas-
ing demonisation of asylum seekers and refugees by mainstream media, 
together with ‘pro-othering’ activism anti-deportation campaigns, cam-
paigns against the detention of asylum seekers, and promotion of the 
rights of migrants. National and local/grass roots organisations have 
continued to be founded for the purposes of one-off  or longer-lasting 
campaigns, as in the work of the National Coalition of Anti-Deportation 
Campaigns. 
 Meanwhile, the diverse range of actors and actions that could be 
considered ‘anti-bodies’ to far-right ‘othering’ can be seen to be rooted 
in diff erent histories, with diff ering motivations, rationales and tactics. 
Some of the anti-fascist activism is not based on a desire to defend 
people from ‘othering’ discrimination, but more rooted in the belief 
that fi ghting fascism defends working-class unions or is fi ghting for the 
soul of the working class or is defending democracy. Conversely, some 
justify anti- immigration legislation on the basis that ‘it was for the good 
of race relations within the UK that the white population had to be 
assured that no large number of blacks would be coming in.’ (Moore 
and Wallace  1975 : 2). Other motivations may be less honourable, espe-
cially where electoral calculations mean that attacking racism or other 
‘isms’, populism and extremism is designed to appeal to a population in 
the short term, or to undermine political opponents. Th e argument over 
the relative legitimacy and effi  cacy of ‘liberal anti-fascism’ and ‘militant 
anti-fascism’ (Olechnowicz  2005 ), also seems to include participants’ 
feelings of moral superiority, as each side feels their approach is what 
will stop fascism. 
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 Indeed, many commentators (and the state itself ) see militant anti- 
fascist activity as more problematic than that of the BNP and EDL. ‘Some 
strategies implemented by civil-society actors with good intentions against 
the far right, have ultimately caused more harm than good. Examples 
of this include combative or militant anti-fascist movements that go to 
extremes to prevent activity by far-right movements.’ (Ramalingam  2012 ). 
Th ese movements’ activities in opposing the far- right both infl ame pas-
sions on the day, increasing the risk of violence, while also—due to the 
connection to mainstream politicians—giving far-right activists the 
impression of a government-sponsored opposition. 
 Similar arguments can be made about the activities of the state and 
associated public bodies and charities, for if they are active against ‘oth-
ering’ by the far right, while ignoring the same ‘othering’ elsewhere, 
they appear to be politically motivated. ‘From a government perspec-
tive, inconsistent implementation of the legislation has in some cases 
led to counter-productive results. For example, some experts argue 
that the ongoing “quarrel” about the ban of the NPD in Germany has 
lent legitimacy to the party.’ (Ramalingam  2012 ). Just as the currents 
of far-right and populist ‘othering’ and the currents of political argu-
ment are in confl ict with each other, so are the forces against them—
sometimes along the same lines. Th us, some activistsoin the anti-fascist 
scene argue that Unite Against Fascism’s politics are problematic due 
to its accommodations with Islamist activists (see Readings  2011 ). Th e 
inability of any one political force to capture an issue means that policy 
moves slowly: in the UK we are unlikely to see either a strong ‘othering’ 
nationalism, or a radical anti-‘othering’. In the UK there is a palpable 
fear amongst campaigning groups/anti-bodies that their gains are frag-
ile, notwithstanding that many of them have been inscribed into law 
and practice. While the evidence for this in terms of direct counter-
demonstrations and anything but periodic violence is slim, activists we 
interviewed elaborated and events embodied a clear sense that an under-
lying but often unspoken culture needs to be challenged with direct 
action and a continuing campaign of mixed education and confronta-
tion. Th ere was a distinct sense in these engagements that racist and 
discriminatory discourse should not be isolated but rather confronted 
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and engineered out of the social system through education, emblematic 
prosecution and the creation of a wider programme of support for the 
(often poor white, black and Muslim) communities that are the direct 
focus of extremist attention. 
 Concluding Remarks 
 In the UK, the far-right populist scene has struggled to maintain its sup-
port despite circumstances that created a fertile environment that could 
have contributed to their sustenance. As Eatwell ( 2004 ) notes, studies 
from the 1960s to the 1970s underlined the growth of nationalism in 
combination with anti-immigration sentiments. In the case of the UK, 
however, these sentiments did not necessarily lead to the support of the 
far right. By engaging hatred rhetoric, provocation and violence, far-right 
movements and parties in Britain failed to forge a respectable represen-
tation in the 1970s. Despite attempts at infi ltration in the years that 
followed, this political family has yet to become electorally successful at 
national level. Th e strong bonds of loyalty that the established political 
parties have created with the electorate, along with the structure of the 
electoral system, makes it diffi  cult for new parties to emerge; further-
more, the fact that the mainstream parties have managed to respond to 
the growing issues of immigration, scepticism over European integration 
and the adopted rhetoric of far-right representatives that are still associ-
ated with extremism and elements of hate speech, violence and discrimi-
nation against the ‘other’, are the major factors contributing to the low 
performance of the far right in the UK. 
 ‘Anti-body’ activism can embrace a wide range of activity, come from 
multiple sources and have diff ering motivations and strategies. Opposition 
to far-right extremism and populism can be divided into three strands. 
Th e fi rst is the more militant anti-fascist activity, which focuses on organ-
ised far-right politics and disrupts this activity, but at the risk of exacer-
bating problems. Second is the activity of the state itself, and the related 
mainstream political actors, which are both against racism and other dis-
criminatory activities, but at the same time accept and contribute to some 
266 G. Lazaridis, V. Tsagkroni
discrimination. Th is may be for electoral reasons and can also be justifi ed 
on the grounds that, for example, restrictions on immigration are neces-
sary to reduce racism. Th e third strand is the broad-based activity of civil-
society organisations, some closely aligned to the state, which, at least 
some of the time, aims to address problems of ‘othering’ in society more 
widely, including that of populist and mainstream politics and the state. 
 References 
 Abedi, A. (2004).  Anti-political establishment parties: A comparative analysis . 
London: Routledge. 
 Albertazzi, D., & McDonnell, D. (2008). Introduction: Th e sceptre and the 
spectre. In D. Albertazzi & D. McDonnell (Eds.),  Twenty-fi rst century popu-
lism: Th e spectre of Western European democracy . Palgrave Macmillan: 
Basingstoke, England, 1–11. 
 Anastasakis, O. (2000).  Extreme right in Europe: A comparative study of recent 
trends (Discussion paper no. 3). London: Th e Hellenic Observatory, Th e 
European Institute London School of Economics and Political Science. 
 Barker, M. (1981).  Th e New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe . 
London. Junction Books. 
 Bale, T., Hampshire, J., & Partos, R. (2011). Having one’s cake and eating it 
too: Cameron’s conservatives and immigration.  Political Quarterly, 82 (3), 
398–406. 
 Bartlett, J., & Littler, M. (2011).  Inside the EDL . London: Demos. 
 BBC. (2013). UKIP is not a racist party, Lord Heseltine told. Retrieved October 
3, 2013, from  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24385139 
 BBC News. (2006). Farage elected new UKIP leader. Retrieved May 4, 2015, 
from  http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/politics/5336126.stm 
 BBC News. (2010b). EDL founder charged with Muslim poppy protest assault. 
Retrieved October 1, 2013, from  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
england-london-11744811 
 BBC News. (2013). EDL leader Tommy Robinson quits group. Retrieved 
October 15, 2013, from  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24442953 
 Bell, M. (2008).  Racism and Equality in the European Union . Oxford, England: 
Oxford University Press. 
 Betz, H. G. (1994). Radical Right Wing Populism in Western Europe (pp. 69–106). 
New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
9 Majority Identitarian Populism in Britain 267
 Betz, H. G. (2007). ‘Against the ‘Green Totalitarianism’: Anti-Islamic Nativism 
in Contemporary Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe’. In 
Christina Schori Liang (Ed.),  Europe for the Europeans: Th e Foreign and 
Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right . London: Ashgate. 
 BNP. (2005). Rebuilding British democracy. Retrieved March 13, 2015, from 
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/BNP_uk_manifesto.pdf 
 BNP. (2015). ‘Securing our British Future’. Retrieved July 3, 2015 from https://
www.bnp.org.uk/sites/default/fi les/bnp_manifesto-2015.pdf. 
 Cameron, D. (2011).  Speech at Munich Security Conference . Retrieved 
April 11, 2015, from  https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/
pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference 
 Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democ-
racy.  Political Studies, 47 , 2–16. 
 Cantle, T. (2001).  Community cohesion : A report of the independent review team 
(p. 79). London: Home Offi  ce. Retrieved June 1, 2015, from  http://image.
guardian.co.uk/sys-fi les/Guardian/documents/2001/12/11/communityco-
hesionreport.pdf 
 Carter, E. L. (2005).  Th e extreme right in Western Europe: Success or failure? (p. 
xiv, 271). Manchester, England: Manchester University Press. 
 Clark, A., Bottom, K., & Copus, C. (2008). More similar than they’d like to 
admit? Ideology, policy and populism in the trajectories of the British 
National Party and Respect.  British Politics, 3 (4), 511–534. 
 Coleman, D. (2010). When Britain becomes ‘majority minority’. 
Retrieved May 2, 2015, from  http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/features/
when-britain-becomes-majority-minority 
 Cutts, D., Ford, R., & Goodwin, M. J. (2011). Anti-immigrant, politically dis-
aff ected or still racist after all? Examining the attitudinal drivers of extreme 
right support in Britain in the 2009 European elections.  European Journal of 
Political Research, 50 (3), 418–440. 
 Daniel, M. (2005).  Cranks and Gadfl ies: Th e story of UKIP . London: Timewell Press. 
 de Beauvoir, S. (1971). Th e Second Sex. Random House. Alfred A. Knopf. 
 de Valette, J. (2015). Th e madness of equality: Same sex 'Marriage’. 
Retrieved May 3, 2015, from  http://www.bnp.org.uk/news/national/
madness-equality-same-sex-marriage 
 Demman, J., & McDonald, P. (1996). Unemployment statistics from 1881 to 
the present day. Retrieved April 3, 2015, from  http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/
rel/lms/labour-market-trends--discontinued-/january-1996/unemployment-
since- 1881.pdf 
268 G. Lazaridis, V. Tsagkroni
 Eatwell, R. (2000). ‘Th e rebirth of the Extreme Right in Western Europe?’, 
 Parliamentary aff airs , 53. 
 Eatwell, R., (2004). ‘Th e Extreme Right in Britain: Th e Long Road to 
‘Modernization’’. In Eatwell & Mudde, (Eds.),  Western Democracies and the 
New Extreme Right Challenge (pp. 62–81). London: Routledge. 
 Eatwell, R., & Goodwin, M. J. (2010). Introduction: Th e “new” extremism in 
twenty-fi rst-century Britain. In R. Eatwell & M. J. Goodwin (Eds.),  Th e new 
extremism in 21st century Britain (pp. 1–20). London: Routledge. 
 EDL’s Mission Statement . Retrieved May 11, 2015, from  https://www.english-
defenceleague.org/?page_id=9 
 European Election Results for UK. Retrieved May 12, 2015, from  http://www.
europarl.org.uk/en/your-meps/european_elections.html 
 Farage, N. (2009). Nigel Farage, Ukip: ‘Other party leaders live in a PC world’. 
Retrieved May 11, 2015, from  http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/
jun/05/nigel-farage-ukip-interview 
 Fella, S., & Bozzini, E. (2013). Fighting racism in the UK. In S. Fella & C. Ruzza 
(Eds.),  Anti-Racist movements in the EU (pp. 53–81). Palgrave Macmillan: 
Basingstoke, England. 
 Fella, S., & Ruzza, C. (2009).  Reinventing the Italian right: Territorial politics, 
populism and ‘Post-Fascism’ . London: Routledge. 
 Fletcher, E. (2008).  Changing support for asylum seekers : An analysis of legislation 
and parliamentary debates (Working paper No. 49). Sussex, England: 
University of Sussex. 
 Ford, R. (2010). Who might vote for the BNP? In R. Eatwell & M. J. Goodwin 
(Eds.),  Th e new extremism in 21st century Britain . London: Routledge. 
 Ford, R., & Goodwin, M. J. (2014).  Revolt on the right: Explaining support for 
the radical right in Britain . Abingdon, England: Routledge. 
 Ford, R., Goodwin, M. J., & Cutts, D. (2012). Strategic Eurosceptics and polite 
xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) 
in the 2009 European Parliament elections.  European Journal of Political 
Research, 51 , 204–234. 
 Fryer, P. (2010).  Staying Power: Th e history of black people in Britain . London. 
Pluto Press. 
 Gilroy, P. (2012). “My Britain is fuck all”: Zombie multiculturalism and the race 
politics of citizenship.  Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, 19 (4), 
380–397. 
 Gillespie, A. (2006).  Becoming other: from social interaction to self-refl ection . New 
York: IAP -Information Age Publishing. 
9 Majority Identitarian Populism in Britain 269
 Goodwin, M. (2011).  New British fascism . London: Routledge. 
 Hage, G. (2010). ‘Th e aff ective politics of racial mis-interpellation’. Th eory, 
Culture & Society December 2010, 27 (7–8), 112–129. 
 Hainsworth, P. (2008).  Th e extreme right in Western Europe . New  York: 
Routledge. 
 Halikiopoulou, D., & Vasilopoulou, S. (2010). Towards a “civic” narrative: 
British national identity and the transformation of the British National Party. 
 Th e Political Quarterly, 81 (4), 583–592. 
 Heitmeyer W (2003). ‘Right-Wing Extremist Violence’ in International 
Handbook of Violence Research. Hagan J, Heitmeyer W (Eds); 
Dordrecht,Boston,London: Kluwer Academic Publishers: 399–436. 
 Hinsliff , G. (2004). It feels like the BNP - only in blazers.  Guardian . Retrieved 
October 1, 2013, from  http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/may/30/
otherparties.immigrationandpublicservices 
 Hope Not Hate. (2013). Overwhelming response. Retrieved 
March 1, 2013, from  http://www.hopenothate.org.uk/blog/article/2549/
overwhelming-response 
 Jackson, P. (2011). ‘Th e EDL: Britain’s ‘New Far Right Social Movement’’ 
Radicalism and New Media group: Northampton. Retrieved March 2, 2015 
from http://nectar.northampton.ac.uk/6015/. 
 Jackson, P., & Gable, G. (2011). Far-Right.com: Nationalist Extremism on the 
Internet. London: Searchlight Magazine. 
 Jeff eries, J. (2005). ‘Th e UK population: Past, present, future’ in focus on people 
and migration. Retrieved May 2, 2015, from  http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/
fertility-analysis/focus-on-people-and-migration/december-2005/focus-on- 
people-and-migration---focus-on-people-and-migration---chapter-1.pdf 
 John, P., Margetts, H., Rowland, D., & Weir, S. (2006).  Th e BNP: Th e roots of 
its appeal . Colchester, England: Democratic Audit, Human Rights Centre. 
 Johnson, C. A., Patten, S., & Betz, H-G. (2005). Identitarian politics and popu-
lism in Canada and the antipodes. In J. Rydgren (Ed.) , Movements of 
Ecclusion: Radical Right-Wing Populism in the Western World (pp. 85–100). 
Adelaide: Nova Science Publishers. 
 Khan, Z. (2000). Muslim presence in Europe: Th e British dimension—Identity, 
integration and community activism.  Current Sociology, 48 (4), 29–43. 
 Koopmans, R. (1996). Explaining the rise of racist and extreme right violence in 
Western Europe: Grievances or opportunities?  European Journal of Political 
Research, 30 (2), 185–216. 
 Laclau, E. (2005).  On populist reason . London: Verso. 
270 G. Lazaridis, V. Tsagkroni
 Lane, H. S. (2012). A study of the English Defence League: What draws people 
of faith to right-wing organisations and what eff ects does the EDL have on 
community cohesion and interfaith relations? Retrieved May 12, 2015, from 
 http://faith-matters.org/images/stories/edl%20report.pdf 
 Lea, J. (2000). Th e Macpherson Report and the question of institutional racism. 
 Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 39 (3), 219–233. 
 May, S., Moddod, T., & Squires, J. (2004).  Ethnicity, nationalism and minority 
rights . Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
 Migration Observatory. (2015). Retrieved April 21, 2015, from  http://www.
migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/ 
 Minkenberg, M. (2002). ‘Th e Radical Right in Post-socialist Central and 
Eastern Europe: Comparative Observations and Interpretations’. East 
European Politics and Society, 335–362. 
 Moore, R., & Wallace, T. (1975).  Slamming the door: Administration of immigra-
tion control . London: Wiley. 
 Moss, V. (2013). Ugly face of UKIP: Sunday Mirror exposes racist and homo-
phobic views of party members.  Mirror . Retrieved October 1, 2013, from 
 http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/ugly-face-ukip-sunday-
mirror-1531879 
 Moufahim, M. (2007). Interpreting Discourse: A Critical Discourse Analysis of 
the Marketing of an Extreme Right Party. Th e Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang. 
Th esis submitted to the University of Nottingham for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy. 
 Mudde, C. (2002). Th e Ideology of Extreme Right. Manchester and New York. 
Manchester University Press. 
 Mudde, C. (2004). Th e populist Zeitgeist.  Governance and Opposition, 39 (3), 
541–563. 
 Mudde, C. (Ed.). (2005). Racist extremism in Central and Eastern Europe. Milton 
Park, England: Routledge. 
 National Front. (2015). National Front policy. Retrieved March 13, 2015, from 
 http://www.britishnationalfront.net/policy.html 
 Norris, P. (2005). Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
 Oakley, R. (2005).  Policing racist crime and violence: A comparative analysis . 
Vienna, Austria: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. 
 Olechnowicz, A. (2005). Liberal anti-fascism in the 1930s the case of Sir Ernest 
Barker.  Albion, 36 , 636–660. 
 Painter, A. (2013).  Democratic stress, the populist signal and extremist threat . 
London: Policy Network. 
9 Majority Identitarian Populism in Britain 271
 Pilkington, H. (2014)  ‘Loud and proud’: Youth Activists in the English Defence 
League . XVIII ISA World Congress of Sociology. Facing an Unequal World: 
Challenges for Global Sociology. Yokohama, 13–19 July 2014. Retrieved 
May 30, 2015, from  https://isaconf.confex.com/isaconf/wc2014/webpro-
gram/Paper42549.html 
 Pink News. (2014). BNP Youth recruitment video: Militant homosexuals want 
gay marriage to destroy families. Retrieved May 2, 2015, from  http://www.
pinknews.co.uk/2014/05/13/bnp-youth-recruitment-video-militant-
homosexuals-want-gay-marriage-to-destroy- families/ 
 Powell, E. (1968). Rivers of blood speech. Retrieved April 16, 2015, from  http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/3643823/Enoch-Powells-Rivers-
of-Blood- speech.html 
 Ramalingam, V. (2012).  Countering far-right extremism . London. 
 Readings, G. (2011). Too many on the Left are continuing to promote 
Islamist extremists.  Left Foot Forward . Retrieved February 20, 2014, from 
 http://www.leftfootforward.org/2011/05/too-many-on-the-left-are-
continuing-to-promote-islamist-extremists/ 
 Richardson, J. E. (2011). Race and racial diff erence: Th e surface and depth of 
BNP ideology. In N. Copsey & G. Macklin (Eds.),  British National Party: 
Contemporary perspectives (pp. 38–61). Abingdon, England: Routledge. 
 Rydgren, J. (2003). ‘Meso-level Reasons for Racism and Xenophobia: Some 
Converging and Diverging Eff ects of Radical Right Populism in France and 
Sweden’.  European Journal of Social Th eory 6(1):45–68. 
 Said, E. (1978).  Orientalism . New York: Pantheon.  
 Smith, J. (2008).  Home Secretary’s speech at the Conference on Preventing Violent 
Extremism (H.  Offi  ce, Ed.). Retrieved April 20, 2015, from  http://tna.
europarchive.org/20090120164241/http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/
Speeches/hs-speech-violent-extremism 
 Stanley, B. (2008). Th e thin ideology of populism.  Journal of Political Ideologies, 
13 (1), 95–110. 
 Taggart, P. A. (2000).  Populism . Buckingham, England: Open University Press. 
 UKIP. (2010). Manifesto. Retrieved May 15, 2015 from http://www.politicsre-
sources.net/area/uk/ge10/man/parties/UKIPManifesto2010.pdf. 
 UKIP. (2012). Th e constitution. Retrieved May 4, 2015, from  http://www.ukip.
org/the_constitution 
 UKIP. (2013). What we stand for. Retrieved October 1, 2013, from  http://www.
ukip.org/issues/policy-pages/what-we-stand-for 
 UKIP. (2015). Believe in Britain: UKIP manifesto 2015. Retrieved May 4, 
2015, from  http://www.ukip.org/manifesto2015# 
272 G. Lazaridis, V. Tsagkroni
 Wallis, R., Bruce, S., & Taylor, D. (1986).  ‘No surrender’: Paisleyism and the poli-
tics of ethnic identity in Northern Ireland . Belfast, Northern Ireland: Department 
of Social Studies, Queen’s University of Belfast. 
 Worley, C. (2005), ‘It’s not about Race, it’s about the community’: New Labour 
and ‘Community Cohesion’.  Critical Social Policy 25(4), 483–496. 
 Zaslove, A. (2008). ‘Here to Stay? Populism as a New Party Type’.  European 
Review , 16, 319–336. 
View publication stats
